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Abstract—Software-defined networking (SDN) enables ad-
vanced operation and management of network deployments
through (virtually) centralised, programmable controllers, which
deploy network functionality by installing rules in the flow
tables of network switches. Although this is a powerful ab-
straction, buggy controller functionality could lead to severe
service disruption and security loopholes, motivating the need
for (semi-)automated tools to find, or even verify absence of,
bugs. Model checking SDNs has been proposed in the literature,
but none of the existing approaches can support dynamic
network deployments, where flow entries expire due to timeouts.
This is necessary for automatically refreshing (and eliminating
stale) state in the network (termed as soft-state in the network
protocol design nomenclature), which is important for scaling up
applications or recovering from failures. In this paper, we extend
our model (MoCS) to deal with timeouts of flow table entries, thus
supporting soft state in the network. Optimisations are proposed
that are tailored to this extension. We evaluate the performance
of the proposed model in UPPAAL using a load balancer and
firewall in network topologies of varying size.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software-defined networking (SDN) [1] revolutionised net-
work operation and management along with future protocol
design; a virtually centralised and programmable controller
‘programs’ network switches through interactions (standard-
ised in OpenFlow [2]) that alter switches’ flow tables. In turn,
switches push packets to the controller when they do not store
state relevant to forwarding these packets. Such a paradigm
departure from traditional networks enables the rapid develop-
ment of advanced and diverse network functionality; e.g., in
designing next-generation inter-data centre traffic engineering
[3], load balancing [4], firewalls [5] and Internet exchange
points (IXPs) [6]. Although this is a powerful abstraction,
buggy controller functionality could lead to severe service
disruption and security loopholes. This has led to a significant
amount of research on SDN verification and/or bug finding,
including static network analysis [7], [8], [9], dynamic real-
time bug finding [10], [11], [12], [13], and formal verifi-
cation approaches, including symbolic execution [14], [15],
[16] and model checking [17], [10], [16], [18] methods. A
comprehensive review of existing approaches along with their
shortcomings can be found in [19].
Model checking is a renowned automated technique for
hardware and software verification and existing model check-
ing approaches for SDNs have shown promising results with
respect to scalability and model expressivity, in terms of
supporting realistic network deployments and the OpenFlow
standard. However, a key limitation of all existing approaches
is that they cannot model forwarding state (added in network
switches flow tables by the controller) that expires and gets
deleted. Without this, one cannot model nor verify the cor-
rectness of SDNs with soft-state which is prominent in the
design of protocols and systems that are resilient to failures
and scalable; e.g., as in [20], where flow scheduling is on
a per-flow basis, and numerous network protocols where in-
network state is not explicitly removed but expires, so that
overhead is minimised [21].
In this paper, we extend our model (MoCS) [17] to support
soft-state, complying with the OpenFlow specification, by
allowing flow entries to time out and be deleted. We propose
relevant optimisations (as in [17]) in order to improve verifica-
tion performance and scalability. We evaluate the performance
of the proposed model extensions in UPPAAL using a load
balancer and firewall in network topologies of varying size.
II. MOCS SDN MODEL
The MoCS model [17] is formally defined by means of
an action-deterministic transition system. We parameterise
the model by the underlying network topology, λ, and the
controller program, CP, in use. The model is a 6-tuple
Mpλ,CPq “ pS, s0, A, ãÑ,AP , Lq, where S is the set of all
states the SDN may enter, s0 the initial state, A the set of
actions which encode the events the network may engage in,
ãÑĎ S ˆ Aˆ S the transition relation describing which exe-
cution steps the system undergoes as it perform actions, AP a
set of atomic propositions describing relevant state properties,
and L : S Ñ 2AP is a labelling function, which relates to any
state s P S a set Lpsq P 2AP of those atomic propositions that
are true for s. Such an SDN model is composed of several
smaller systems, which model network components (hosts1,
switches and the controller) that communicate via queues
and, combined, give rise to the definition of ãÑ. A detailed
description of MoCS’ components and transitions can be found
in [17]. Due to lack of space, in this paper, we only discuss
aspects of the model that are required to understand and verify
the soundness of the proposed model extensions, and examples
used in the evaluation section. Figure 1 illustrates a high-level
view of OpenFlow interactions, modelled actions and queues,
including the proposed extensions discussed in Section III.
1A host can act as a client and/or server.
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Fig. 1: A high-level view of OpenFlow interactions (left half)
and modelled actions (right half). A red solid-line arrow
depicts an action which, when fired, (1) dequeues an item
from the queue the arrow begins at, and (2) (possibly) adds an
item in the queue the arrowhead points to (or multiple items if
the arrow is double-headed). Deleting an item from the target
queue is denoted by a reverse arrowhead; modifying in, by
a hammerhead. A forked arrow denotes (possibly) multiple
targeted queues.
States and queues: A state is a triple ppi, δ, γq, where pi is a
family of hosts, each consisting of a receive queue (rcvq); δ is
a family of switches, consisting of a switch packet queue (pq),
switch forward queue (fq), switch control queue (cq), switch
flow table (ft); γ consists of the local controller program state
cs P CS , and a family of controller queues: request queue (rq),
barrier-reply queue (brq) and flow-removed queue (frq). So pi
and δ describe the data-plane, and γ the control plane. The
network components communicate via the shared queues. Each
transition models a certain network event that will involve
some of the queues, and maybe some other network state.
Concurrency is modelled through interleavings of those events.
Transitions: Each transition is labelled with an action α P A
that indicates the nature of the network event. We write
s
αãÝÑ s1 and ps, α, s1q PãÑ interchangeably to denote that the
network moved from state s to s1 by executing transition α.
The parts of the network involved in each individual α, i.e.
packets, rules, barriers, switches, hosts, ports and controller
states, are included in the transition label as parameters; e.g.,
matchpsw, pkt, rq P A denotes the action that switch sw
matches packet pkt by rule r and, as a result, forwards it
accordingly, leading to a new state after transition.
Atomic propositions: The propositions in AP are statements
on (1) controller program states, denoted by Qpqq which
expresses that the controller program is in state q P CS ,
allowing one to reason about the controller’s internal data
structures, and (2) packet header fields – those packets may
be in any switch buffer pq or host buffer rcvq (but no other
buffers). For instance, DpktPsw .pq . P ppktq is a legitimate
atomic proposition that states that there is a packet in sw ’s
packet queue that satisfies packet pkt property P .
Topology: λ describes the network topology as a bijective map
which associates one network interface (a pair of networking
device and physical port) to another.
Specification Logic: The properties of the SDNs to be
checked in this paper are safety properties, expressed in linear-
time temporal logic without ‘next-step’ operator, LTLzt©u. We
have enriched the logic by modal operators of dynamic logic
[22], allowing formula construct of the form rαp~xqsP stating
that whenever an event αp~xq happened, P must hold. Note that
P may contain variables from x. This extension is syntax sugar
in the sense that the formulae may be expressed by additional
state; e.g.,
“
matchpsw , pkt , rq‰pr.fwdPort “ dropq states
that if match happened, it was via a rule that dropped the
packet. This permits specification formulae to be interpreted
not only over states, but also over actions that have happened.
The model checking problem then, for an SDN model Mpλ,CPq
with a given topology λ, a control program CP and a formula
ϕ of the specification logic as described above, boils down
to checking whether all runs of Mpλ,CPq satisfy ϕ, short
Mpλ,CPq |ù 2ϕ.
SDN Operation: End-hosts send and receive packets (send
and recv actions in Figure 1) and switches process incoming
packets by matching them (or failing to) with a flow table
entry (rule). In the former case (match action), the packet
is forwarded as prescribed by the rule. In the opposite case
(nomatch action), the packet is sent to the controller (Pack-
etIn message on the left side of Figure 1). The controllers
packet handler is executed in response to incoming PacketIn
messages; as a result of its execution, its local state may
change, a number of packets (PacketOut message) and rule
updates (FlowMod message), interleaved with barriers (Bar-
rierReq message), may be sent to network switches. Network
switches react to incoming controller messages; they forward
packets sent by the controller as specified in the respective
PacketOut message (fwd action), update their own forwarding
tables (add/del actions), respecting set barriers and notifying
the controller (BarrierRes message) when said barriers are
executed (brepl action). Finally, upon receiving a BarrierRes
message, the controller executes the respective handler (bsync
action), which can result in the same effects as the PacketIn
message handler.
Abstractions: To obtain finitely representable states, all
queues in the model must be finitely representable. For packet
queues we use multisets, subject to p0,8q abstraction [23];
a packet either does not appear in the queue or appears an
unbounded number of times. The other queues are simply
modelled as finite sets. Modelling queues as sets means that
entries are not processed in the order of arrival. This is
intentional for packet queues but for controller queues this
may limit behaviour unless the controller program is order-
insensitive. We focus on those controller programs in this
paper.
III. MODELLING FLOW ENTRY TIMEOUTS
In order to model soft-state in the network, we enrich our
model with two new actions that model flow entry timeouts
and subsequent handling of these timeouts by the controller
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program. Note that in our model, timeouts are not triggered
by any kind of clock; instead, they are modelled through the
interleaving of actions in the underlying transition system that
ensure that flow removal (and subsequent handling by the
controller program) will appear as it would for any possible
value of a timeout in a real system.
The new actions are defined as follows: frmvdpsw , rq mod-
els the timeout event, as an action in the transition system that
removes the flow entry (rule) r from switch sw and notifies
the controller by placing a FlowRemoved message (see Figure
1) in the respective queue (frq). The fsyncpsw , r , csq action
models the call to the FlowRemoved message handler. As a
result of the handler execution, the controller’s local state (cs)
may change, a number of packets (PacketOut messages) and
rule updates (FlowMod messages), interleaved with barriers
(BarrierReq message), may be sent to network switches. In
order to model timeouts, rules are augmented with a timeout
bit which, when true, signals that the installed rule can be
removed at any time, i.e., the frmvd-action can be interleaved,
in any order, with any other action that is enabled at any state
later than the installation of this rule.
To support our examples, we add to the set of FlowMod
messages a modify flow entry instruction. In [17] we only
used addpsw , rq and delpsw , rq messages, for installing and
deleting rule r at switch sw , respectively. We now add
modpsw , f , aq to these messages. This instructs switch sw that
if a rule is found in sw .ft that matches field f, its forwarding
actions are modified by a. If no such rule exists, modp¨q does
not do anything.
Optimisation: To tackle the state-space explosion, we exploit
the fact that some traces are observationally (w.r.t. the property
to be proved) equivalent, so that only one of those needs to be
checked. This technique, referred to as partial-order reduction
(POR) [24], reduces the number of interleavings (traces) one
has to check. To prove equivalence of traces, one needs actions
to be permutable and invisible to the property at hand. This is
the motivation for the following definition:
Definition 1 (SAFE ACTIONS) Given a context CTX “
pCP, λ, ϕq, and SDN model Mpλ,CPq “ pS,A, ãÑ, s0,AP , Lq,
an action αp¨q P Apsq is called safe if it is (1) independent
of any other action β in A, i.e. executing α after β leads to
the same state as running β after α, and (2) unobservable for
ϕ (also called ϕ-invariant), i.e., s |ù ϕ iff αpsq |ù ϕ for all
s P S with α P Apsq.
The following property of controller programs is needed to
show safety:
Definition 2 (ORDER-SENSITIVE CONTROLLER PROGRAM)
A controller program CP is order-sensitive if there exists a state
s P S and two actions α, β in tctrlp¨q, bsyncp¨q, fsyncp¨qu such
that α, β P Apsq and s αãÝÑ s1 βãÝÑ s2 and s βãÝÑ s3 αãÝÑ s4 with
s2 ‰ s4.
In [17] we already showed that certain actions are safe and
can be used for PORs. We now show that the new fsyncp¨q
action is safe on certain conditions.
Lemma 1 (SAFENESS PREDICATES FOR fsync) For transition
system Mpλ,CPq “ pS,A, ãÑ, s0,AP , Lq and a formula ϕ P
LTLzt©u, α “ fsyncpsw , r , csq is safe iff the following two
conditions are satisfied:
Independence CP is not order-sensitive
Invisibility if Qpqq in AP occurs in ϕ, then
α is ϕ-invariant
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given a context CTX “ pCP, λ, ϕq and an SDN network
model Mpλ,CPq “ pS,A, ãÑ, s0,AP , Lq, for each state s P S
define amplepsq as follows: if tα P Apsq | α safe u ‰ H,
then amplepsq “ tα P Apsq | α safe u; otherwise amplepsq “
Apsq. Next, we define Mfrpλ,CPq “ pSfr , A, ãÑfr , s0,AP , Lfr q,
where Sfr Ď S the set of states reachable from the initial
state s0 under ãÑfr , Lfr psq “ Lpsq for all s P Sfr and ãÑfr
Ď Sfr ˆAˆ Sfr is defined inductively by the rule:
s
αãÝÑ s1
s
αãÝÑfr s1
if α P amplepsq
Now we can proceed to extend the POR Theorem of [17]:
Theorem 1 (FLOW-REMOVED EQUIVALENCE) Given a prop-
erty ϕ P LTLzt©u, it holds that Mfrpλ,CPq satisfies ϕ iff Mpλ,CPq
satisfies ϕ.
The proof is a consequence of Lemma 1 applied to the proof
of Theorem 2 in [17]. See Appendix A for a detailed proof.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we experimentally evaluate the proposed
extensions in terms of verification performance and scalability.
We use a realistic controller program that enables a network
switch to act both as a load balancer and stateful firewall (see
§V-CP1). The load balancer keeps track of the active sessions
between clients and servers in the cluster (see Figure 2), while,
at the same time, only allowing specific clients to access
the cluster. Soft state is employed here so that flow entries
for completed sessions (that were previously admitted by the
firewall) time out and are deleted by the switch without having
to explicitly monitor the sessions and introduce unnecessary
signalling (and overhead). In the underlying SDN model, the
frmvd action is fired, which, in turn, deletes the flow entry
from the switch’s table and notifies the controller of that. This
enables the fsync action that calls the flow removal handler.
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Fig. 2: Four clients and two servers connecting to an OF-
switch.
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is not white-listed.
A session is initiated by a client which sends a packet
(pkt in §V-CP1) to a known cluster address; servers are
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not directly visible to the client. Sessions are bi-directional
therefore the controller must install respective rules to the
switch to allow traffic to and from the cluster. The property
that is checked here is that (1) the traffic (i.e. number of
sessions, assuming they all produce similar traffic patterns),
and resulting load, is uniformly distributed to all available
servers, and (2) that traffic from non-whitelisted clients is
blocked. More concretely, “a packet from a ‘dodgy’ address
should never reach the servers, and the difference between the
number of assigned sessions at each server should never be
greater than 1”, formally,
2 `@si, sj P Servers @pkt P si .rcvq .
 pkt .src “ dodgy ^ ∣∣sLoadrsis ´ sLoadrsjs∣∣ ă 2˘ (ϕ)
where sLoad stores the active session count for each server.
In the first (buggy) version of the controller’s packet handler
(shaded grey in §V-CP1) and flow removal handler §V-CP2,
the controller program assigns new sessions to servers in a
round-robin fashion and keeps track of the active sessions
(array deplSessions in the provided pseudocode). When a
session expires, the respective flow table entry is expected
to expire and be deleted by the switch without any signalling
between the controller, clients or servers2. As stated above,
this controller program does not satisfy safety property ϕ
because the controller does nothing to rebalance the load when
a session expires. Our model implementation3 discovered the
bug in the topology shown in Figure 2 with 3 sessions in 11ms
exploring 202 states.
In the second (still buggy) version of the controller, session
scheduling is more sophisticated (shaded blue in §V-CP1); a
session is assigned to the server with the least number of active
sessions. Although the updated load balancing algorithm does
keep track of the active sessions per server, this controller is
still buggy because no rebalancing takes place when sessions
expire. In a topology of 4 clients and 2 servers, we were able
to discover the bug in 52ms after exploring 714 states.
We fix the bug by allowing the controller program to
rebalance the active sessions, when (1) a session expires and
(2) the load is about to get out of balance, by moving one
session from the most-loaded to the least-loaded server (§V-
CP3). In the same topology as above, we verified the property
in 625ms after exploring 15068 states.4
Next, we evaluate the performance of the proposed model
and extensions for verifying the correctness of the property
in a given SDN. We do that by verifying ϕ with the correct
controller program, discussed above, and scaling up the topol-
ogy in terms of clients, servers and active sessions. Results are
listed in Table I and state exploration is illustrated in Figure 4.
Table I lists performance of the model checker for verifying
the correct controller program with PORs disabled on the
2It is worth stressing that modelling such functionality is not supported by
existing model checking approaches, such as [17] and [18], where flow table
entries can only be explicitly deleted by the controller.
3UPPAAL [25] is the back-end verification engine for MoCS and all
experiments were run on an 18-Core iMac pro, 2.3GHz Intel Xeon W with
128GB DDR4 memory.
4Note that the fsync-optimisation was not enabled in the examples above.
left and with PORs enabled on the right, respectively. For
each chosen topology we list the number of states explored,
CPU time used, and memory used. The topology is shaped
as in Figure 2, and parametrised by the number of clients
(ranging from 3 to 5) and servers (ranging from 2 to 5),
as indicated in Table I. The number of required packets and
rules, respectively, is shown in grey. These numbers are always
uniquely determined by the choice of topology. Where there
are no entries in the table (indicated by a dash) the verification
did not terminate within 24 hours.
The results clearly show that the verification scales well
with the number of servers but not with the number of clients.
The reason for the latter is that for each additional client an
additional packet is sent, which, according to programs §V-
CP1 and CP3, leads to 7 additional actions without timeouts
and to 12 with timeouts. The causal ordering of these actions is
shown in Fig. 3. The sub-branch in red shows the actions that
appear due to a timeout of the added rule. Thus, the number of
states is exponential in the number of clients: every new action
in Fig. 3 leads to a new change of state, thus doubling the
possible number of states. This exponential blow-up happens
whether we have timeouts or not. With timeouts, however,
we have worse exponential complexity as there are more new
states generated.
sendppktq
nomatchppktq
ctrlppktq
addpruleq
matchppkt , ruleq
addprulesq
frmvdprulesq
fsyncprulesq
modprq modprsq
fwdppktq
recvppktq
Fig. 3: The causal enabling relation between actions for an
additional packet pkt; only the relevant arguments are shown
using the same nomenclature as in the pseudocode.
The results also demonstrate that, for network setups with
three clients, the POR optimisation reduces the state space –
and thus the verification time – by about half. For more clients
the reduction is far more significant, given that the verification
of the unoptimised model did not terminate within 24 hours.
This is not surprising as the number of possible interleavings is
massively increased by the non-deterministic timeout events.
V. CONTROLLER PROGRAMS
CP1 implements the PacketIn message handler that pro-
cesses packets sent by switches when the nomatch action is
fired. The two different versions of functionality discussed
in the paper are defined by the leastConnectionsScheduling
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Fig. 4: Explored States (logarithmic scale). Wide bars repre-
sent the optimised model and narrow ones (inside) the unop-
timised model. Uncoloured bars represent non-termination.
TABLE I: Performance by number of clients and servers
States CPU 
user 
time 
Resident 
memory 
[KiB]
States CPU 
user 
time
Resident 
memory 
[KiB]
3 2 3 13 15,068 553ms 9,516 8,264 317ms 9,016
3 3 3 19 15,068 700ms 10,688 8,264 322ms 8,792
3 4 3 25 15,068 841ms 11,936 8,264 483ms 10,488
3 5 3 31 15,068 987ms 15,280 8,264 563ms 12,844
4 2 4 17 — — — 13,244,474 13.2m 2,508,528
4 3 4 25 — — — 24,623,435 30.77m 5,432,004
4 4 4 33 — — — 24,623,435 37.23m 13,129,916
4 5 4 41 — — — 24,623,435 42.64m 15,443,136
5 2 5 21 — — — — — —
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constant. When leastConnectionsScheduling is false, server
selection is done in a round-robin fashion, whereas, in the
opposite case, the controller assigns the new session to the
server with the least number of active sessions.
CP2 implements the naive (and buggy) FlowRemoved mes-
sage handler. When soft state expires in the network, the
handler merely updates its local state to reflect the update in
the load.
CP3 implements a more sophisticated (and correct) FlowRe-
moved message handler. When soft state expires in the net-
work, the handler updates its local state to reflect the update
in the load and re-assigns active sessions from the most to the
least loaded server, by updating the flow table of the switch
accordingly.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed model checking of SDN networks with
flow entries (rules) that time out. Timeouts pose problems due
to the great number of resulting interleavings to be explored.
Our approach is the first one to deal with timeouts, exploiting
partial-order reductions, and performing reasonably well for
small networks. We demonstrated that bug finding works well
for SDN networks in the presence of flow entry timeouts.
Future work includes exploring flow removals with timeouts
that are constrained by integer to enforce certain orderings of
timeout messages as well as improvements in performance,
for instance, by using bounded model checking tools for
concurrent programs.
Controller Program CP 1: PacketIn Message Handler
1: handler pktIn(pkt , sw )
2: if pkt .srcIP ‰ dodgy client then
3: if  deplSessionsrpkt .srcIPs then
4: if  leastConnectionsScheduling then
{{ Round-Robin rotation
5: server Ð server mod 2` 1
6: else
{{ Least-Connections scheduling
7: server Ð min`sLoadrs˘
8: end if
{{ Initialisation of flow to server
9: rule.srcIP Ð pkt .srcIP
10: rule.in port Ð pkt .in port
11: rule.fwdPort Ð server
{{ Initialisation of symmetric rules
12: rules .srcIP Ð server
13: rules .destIP Ð pkt .srcIP
14: rules .fwdPort Ð pkt .in port
15: rules .timeout Ð true
{{ Initialisation of drop rule ruled
16: ruled .srcIP Ð dodgy client
17: ruled .fwdPort Ð drop
{{ Deployment of rules
18: send message
`
FlowMod
`
addpruleq˘, sw˘
19: send message
`
FlowMod
`
addprulesq˘, sw˘
20: send message
`
FlowMod
`
addpruledq˘, sw˘
{{ Update firewall state table
21: sLoadrserver s++
22: deplSessionsrpkt .srcIPs Ð true
23: end if
{{ PacketOut: sending pkt out through sw
24: send messagetPacketOutppkt , serverq, sw˘
25: end if
26: end handler
Controller Program CP 2: Naive FlowRemoved message
handler
1: handler flowRmvd (rules , sw )
2: sLoadrrules .srcIPs--
3: deplSessionsrrules .destIPs Ð false
4: end handler
Controller Program CP 3: Correct FlowRemoved message
handler
1: handler flowRmvd (rules , sw )
2: sLoadrrules .srcIPs--
3: deplSessionsrrules .destIPs Ð false
4: if max
`
sLoadrs˘´min`sLoadrs˘ ą 1 then
5: r Ð the rule in sw .ft with fwdPort “ max psLoadrsq
6: rs Ð symmetric rule of r
7: cm Ð mod`r , fwdPort Ð minpsLoadrsq˘
8: cms Ð mod`rs , srcIP Ð minpsLoadrsq˘
9: send message
`
FlowModpcm, swq˘
10: send message
`
FlowModpcms , swq˘
11: sLoad
“
max
`
sLoadrs˘‰--
12: sLoad
“
min
`
sLoadrs˘‰++
13: end if
14: end handler
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APPENDIX
A Proofs
Lemma 1 (SAFENESS) For transition system Mpλ,CPq “
pS,A, ãÑ, s0, AP, Lq and a formula ϕ P LTLzt©u, α “
fsyncpsw , r , csq is safe iff the following two conditions are
satisfied:
Independence CP is not order-sensitive
Invisibility if Qpqq in AP occurs in ϕ, then
α is ϕ-invariant
Proof. To show safety we need to show two properties:
independence (action is independent of any other action) and
invisibility w.r.t. the context, in particular controller program,
topology function and formula ϕ.
Independence: Recall that two actions α and β ‰ α are
independent iff for any state s such that α P Apsq and
β P Apsq:
(1) α P Apβpsqq and β P Apαpsqq
(2) αpβpsqq “ βpαpsqq
(1) It can be easily checked that no instance of safe actions
fsyncp¨q disables any other action, nor is any safe
fsyncp¨q disabled by any other action, so the first
condition of independence holds.
(2) For any safe α “ fsyncp¨q and any other action β we can
assume already that they meet Condition (1). To show
that any interleaving with any action β ‰ α leads to the
same state, we observe that
§ if β is not an fsync, ctrl or bsync action, then the
mutations of queues by these actions do not interfere
with each other.
§ The interesting cases occur when β is in
tfsyncp¨q, ctrlp¨q, bsyncp¨qu. From the first condition
we know that CP is not order-sensitive, which implies
that α and β are independent. Order-insensitivity is a
relatively strong condition but it ensures correctness
of the lemma and thus partial order reduction.5 Thus
any interleaving of α and β leads to the same state.
Invisibility: α “ fsyncpsw , r , csq may only affect frq, sw1.fq ,
sw1.cq (for some switches sw1), and the control state cs .
We know by definition of our Specification Language that an
atomic proposition cannot refer to frq or any fq , cq . In case
the control state changes, α is invisible to ϕ because of the
second condition (Invisibility) of Lemma 1.
Theorem 1 (FLOW-REMOVED EQUIVALENCE) Given a prop-
erty ϕ P LTLzt©u, it holds that Mfrpλ,CPq satisfies ϕ iff Mpλ,CPq
satisfies ϕ.
Proof. If amplepsq satisfies the following conditions:
C1 (Non)emptiness condition: ∅ ‰ amplepsq Ď Apsq.
C2 Dependency condition: Let s α1ãÝÑ s1... αnãÝÑ sn βãÝÑ t be a
run in M. If β P Azamplepsq depends on amplepsq, then
αi P amplepsq for some 0 ă i ď n, which means that in
every path fragment of M, β cannot appear before some
transition from amplepsq is executed.
5Generalisations by a more clever analysis of the controller program are a
future research topic.
This is an extended version of the same work (with the same name), which appears in FMCAD 2020
C3 Invisibility condition: If amplepsq ‰ Apsq (i.e., state s is
not fully expanded), then every α P amplepsq is invisible.
C4 Every cycle in Mfr contains a fully expanded state s (i.e.
amplepsq “ Apsq).
then for each path in M there exists a stutter-trace equivalent
path in Mfr , and vice-versa, denoted M st”Mfr – as we now
show.
C1 The (non)emptiness condition is trivial since by definition
of amplepsq it follows that amplepsq “ ∅ iff Apsq “ ∅.
C2 By assumption β P Azamplepsq depends on amplepsq.
But with our definition of amplepsq this is impossible
as all actions in amplepsq are safe and by definition
independent of all other actions.
C3 The validity of the invisibility condition is by definition
of ample and safe actions.
C4 We now show that every cycle in Mfrpλ,CPq contains a fully
expanded state s, i.e. a state s such that amplepsq “ Apsq.
By definition of amplepsq it is equivalent to show that
there is no cycle in Mfrpλ,CPq consisting of safe actions
only. We show this by contradiction, assuming such a
cycle of only safe actions exists.
Distinguish two cases.
Case 1 A sequence of safe actions of same type.
Let ρ an execution of Mfrpλ,CPq which con-
sists of only one type of fsync-actions: ρ “
s1
fsyncpsw1,r1,cs1qãÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑfr s2 fsyncpsw2,r2,cs2qãÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑfr
...si´1
fsyncpswi´1ri´1,,csi´1qãÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑfr si. Suppose ρ
is a cycle. According to the fsync seman-
tics, for each transition s
fsyncpsw ,r ,csqãÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑfr s1,
where s “ ppi, δ, γq, s 1 “ ppi1, δ1, γ1q, it holds that
γ1.frq “ γ.frqztru as we use sets to represent
frq buffers. Hence, for the execution ρ it holds
γi.frq “ γ1.frqztr1, r2, ...ri´1u which implies
that s1 ‰ si. Contradiction.
Case 2 A sequence of different safe actions. Suppose
there exists a cycle with mixed safe actions
starting in s1 and ending in si. Distinguish the
following cases.
i) There exists at least a fsync action in the
cycle. According to the effects of safe tran-
sitions, the fsync action will switch to a state
with smaller frq. It is important here that no
action of other type than fsync accesses frq.
This implies that s1 ‰ si. Contradiction.
ii) No fsync action in the cycle. This is already
established in [17].
